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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT NASHVILLE 
Lloyd Wade, 
Employee, 
) Docket No. 2015-06-0970 
) 
v. 
AAA Cooper Transportation, 
Employer, Self-insured. 
) State File No. 91748-2015 
) 
) Chief Judge Kenneth M. Switzer 
) 
EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING REQUESTED RELIEF 
This case came before the undersigned workers' compensation judge on the 
Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Lloyd Wade, pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (20 15). The present focus of this case is the 
timeliness of the notice of injury and whether Mr. Wade sustained an injury arising 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment with AAA Cooper. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Court finds Mr. Wade provided timely notice, but has not 
satisfied his burden at this interlocutory stage to show the injury is work-related. 
Therefore, he is not entitled to the requested relief. 1 
History of Claim 
Mr. Wade is a fifty-nine-year-old resident of Davidson County, Tennessee. He 
worked at AAA Cooper and its predecessor as a truck driver for approximately fifteen 
years. He served in the United States Marine Corps from 1976 until his honorable 
discharge in 1996. Mr. Wade suffered a work-related back injury on October 7, 2005 
(Ex. 5), which resolved. 
Mr. Wade testified that on May 11, 2015, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he injured 
his back when attempting to maneuver heavy office equipment and supplies through a 
narrow doorway. According to his affidavit (Ex. 2), Mr. Wade returned to his workplace 
and reported his injury to his supervisor, Rick Daniel. Mr. Daniel acted unconcerned and 
took no steps to provide medical attention. Mr. Wade continued to work over the next 
1 A complete listing of the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Expedited Hearing is attached to this Order 
as an appendix. 
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few weeks, despite worsening pain, which he attempted to alleviate with over-the-counter 
medications and stretching exercises. Co-workers helped him load his truck, but he 
continued to deliver and move equipment on his own. The pain eventually intensified to 
the point where he experienced difficulty with tasks of daily living. 
The only medical records admitted into evidence at the expedited hearing appear 
incomplete2 and consist of ten pages documenting care at the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Tennessee Valley Healthcare System. See generally Ex. 1. A "Medication 
Reconciliation" dated May 1, 2015 - prior to the alleged date of injury - lists various 
conditions including "back pain." It also indicates Mr. Wade received a steroid injection 
and underwent x-rays on that date. 
On May 16, 2015, he saw his primary care provider, Lori Emery, FNP. He 
offered no notes from this examination into evidence, although the records contain an 
MRI report bearing that date and listing Ms. Emery as the referral source. The 
"impression" portion of the MRI report listed several lumbar issues. Providers at the VA 
memorialized the MRI results in a letter to Mr. Wade sent on or about May 19, 2016, 
informing him of a "slipped disc" and that the MRI revealed arthritis in several vertebrae. 
A progress note dated June 12, 2016, under "review of symptoms" reads, "States 
he is in severe back pain, for the past few months." It is unclear due to missing pages 
whether Ms. Emery is the author of that note. She wrote a letter the same day stating that 
Mr. Wade "is having an exacerbation of back pain and is in excruciating pain. He is 
unable to drive a trucik [sic] for now." The VA records contain no mention of a 
workplace incident, and the letter on June 12, 2015, is the first mention of work 
restrictions. 
According to Mr. Wade, he presented the letter to Mr. Daniel, who told him he 
"could not accept that." Thus on June 16, 2015, Mr. Wade completed a Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) "Leave of Absence Request." Ex. 7. He testified he completed 
FMLA absence request when Mr. Daniel told him he "needed to fill out some 
paperwork" because the June 12, 2015 letter from the VA restricted him from working. 
Mr. Wade returned to work to take a "Driver Fitness" test on June 29, 2015. The 
report documenting the results (Ex. 6) lists a "health history," under which a box is 
checked indicating he suffers from "chronic low back pain." Mr. Wade explained the 
physician checked the box, but acknowledged he signed the form certifying it to be true 
and accurate, so he could, in his opinion, keep his job. 
Mr. Wade completed a second "Leave of Absence Request" on June 30, 2015, and 
a "Supplemental Leave Request" on September 24, 2015. The September form lists 
2 The pages are numbered with several pages missing. 
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options for "reason for leave," including "work-related injury or illness." On Mr. Wade's 
form, the box checked reads: "my own serious health condition." (Underlining in 
original.) Mr. Wade testified at the hearing that Mr. Daniel assisted him in completing 
the FMLA leave requests and, though he did not check that option, he acknowledged 
signing the forms. 
Mr. Daniel did not appear at the expedited hearing. According to Mr. Daniel's 
affidavit (Ex. 3), at no time during the FMLA process did Mr. Wade report a work-
related injury. Moreover, he never reported a June 2015 back injury to anyone at AAA 
Cooper during his employment. Instead, Mr. Daniel stated in his affidavit: 
Though I cannot recall the specific date, a few months prior to June 2015, 
Mr. Wade told me that he was having back pain. At that time, I asked him 
if he had sustained a work injury and needed treated. [sic] Mr. Wade 
responded that he had not had a work injury and declined treatment. He 
informed me that he was treating at the VA for back pain. Mr. Wade did 
not tell me about a specific incident, work-related or otherwise, that caused 
his back pain, other than he had previously hurt his back while in the 
Marine Corps. 
Mr. Wade acknowledged discussing his military service at work, but denied hurting his 
back while in the Marines. He further denied hurting his back in any previous 
employment. 
Mr. Wade's FMLA leave expired in November 2015, after which AAA Cooper 
terminated him for failing to return to work. He has been unable to work since that time. 
Mr. Wade continues treating at the VA for back pain. 
Mr. Wade filed his Petition for Benefit Determination on November 16, 2015. He 
did not complete the "date of injury" section on the form. The First Report ofinjury (Ex. 
4) lists the date of injury as June 12, 2015, but the form is undated and does not indicate 
who prepared it. Mr. Wade explained June 12, 2015, was the date he gave AAA Cooper 
the letter from Ms. Emery, but the injury actually occurred on May 11, 2015. 
After the parties failed to reach an agreement at mediation, the mediating 
specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice indicating that Mr. Wade seeks a panel of 
physicians, reimbursement for past medical expenses and past temporary disability 
benefits. Mr. Wade filed a Request for Expedited Hearing, and the Court heard the 
matter on April21, 2016. 
At the expedited hearing, Mr. Wade asserted he sustained an injury by accident 
arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment when he hurt his back 
while delivering heavy office furniture and supplies for AAA Cooper. He additionally 
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argued he reported the injury to Mr. Daniel, but Mr. Daniel failed to offer medical care. 
AAA Cooper countered that Mr. Wade is not entitled to workers compensation benefits 
because he did not satisfY his burden under McCalP to show he sustained an injury by 
accident arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Further, 
AAA Cooper contended Mr. Wade failed to give timely notice of his injuries. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
In order to grant or deny Mr. Wade's requested relief, the Court must apply the 
following legal principles. Mr. Wade bears the burden of proof on all essential elements 
of his claim. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015). 
However, he need not prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence in order to obtain relief at this expedited hearing. McCord v. Advantage Human 
Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 
(Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). Rather, at an expedited hearing, Mr. 
Wade has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court 
can determine he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. !d.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-239(d)(1) (2015). 
Notice 
The requirement that an employee provide proper notice is a prerequisite to 
recovery of benefits. Therefore, the Court will address the issue first. Here, AAA 
Cooper asserted Mr. Wade failed to give adequate notice of an alleged injury. Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-201 (2015) provides in pertinent part: 
(a)(1) Every injured employee or the injured employee's representative 
shall, immediately upon the occurrence of an injury, or as soon thereafter as 
is reasonable and practicable, give or cause to be given to the employer 
who has no actual notice, written notice of the injury, and the employee 
shall not be entitled to physician's fees or to any compensation that may 
have accrued under this chapter, from the date of the accident to the giving 
of notice, unless it can be shown that the employer had actual knowledge of 
the accident. No compensation shall be payable under this chapter, unless 
the written notice is given to the employer within thirty (30) days after the 
occurrence of the accident, unless reasonable excuse for failure to give the 
notice is made to the satisfaction of the tribunal to which the claim for 
3 Counsel for AAA Cooper referred to controlling case law as McCall [v. Nat'! Health Care Corp.], 100 S.W.3d 209 
(Tenn. 2003)]. As noted infra, the more recent authority is McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, where the 
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board cited McCall and characterized the standard of proof adopted by 
the general assembly under the Reform Act of2013 as "distinctly similar" to that announced in McCall. McCord v. 
Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers' 
Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). 
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compensation may be presented. 
In Hosford v. Red Rover Preschool, No. 2014-05-0002, 2014 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS I, at *15 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 2, 2014), the Appeals 
Board explained: 
The notice requirement contained in section 50-6-201 "exists so that an 
employer will have an opportunity to make a timely investigation of the 
facts while still readily accessible, and to enable the employer to provide 
timely and proper treatment for an injured employee." Jones v. Sterling 
Last Corp., 962 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. 1998). Consequently, "the giving 
of statutory notice to the employer is an absolute prerequisite to the right of 
an employee to recover compensation under the workers' compensation 
law." Bogus v. Manpower Temp. Serv., 823 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn. 1992). 
When lack of notice is raised as a defense, the burden is on the employee to 
show that notice was given, the employer had actual notice, or the failure to 
give notice was reasonable under the circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-201(a)(l) (2014); Jones, 962 S.W.2d at 472. 
Applying these principles, the Court finds Mr. Wade provided AAA Cooper 
adequate notice of his injury. This Court had the opportunity to observe Mr. Wade 
testifY. To the Court, Mr. Wade appeared forthcoming, reasonable and honest during his 
testimony. These characteristics, according to the Tennessee Supreme Court, are indicia 
of reliability. See Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 694-695 (Tenn. 2014). Weighed 
against Mr. Daniel's affidavit, the Court finds Mr. Wade's live testimony and affidavit 
more credible. 
However, our Appeals Board rejected the assertion that "mere notice of an alleged 
workplace accident, in and of itself, is sufficient to trigger an employer's duty to provide 
medical benefits[.]" McCord, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6 at *10, 13. 
Instead, the Board explained the statute and rules contemplate that an employer has an 
initial period of time following rec ipt of notice of a work accident to investigate the 
claim and make a preliminary determination on compensability.4 /d. at * 12. The Board 
4 McCord referenced the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations Chapter 0800-2-14, "Claims Handling 
Standards," which outline the steps employers/carriers must take to investigate a claim upon receipt of verbal or 
written notice of an alleged workplace injury from an employee. Notably, the rules require employers/insurers to 
make a decision on compensability within fifteen days of verbal or written notice of accident. Tenn. Comp. R. & 
Regs. 0800-2-14(7) (2015). In addition, "[a]ll pertinent documents ofthe [Bureau] of Workers' Compensation shall 
be filed within fifteen (15) days of verbal or written notice of accident." !d. In this matter, the file contains no 
notice of denial, and AAA Cooper introduced a wage statement (Ex. 9) into evidence at the expedited hearing, well 
past the fifteen-day timeframe for investigation. The "Claims Handling Standards" further provide that, "In addition 
to other penalties provided by applicable law and regulation, violations of any of the above rules shall be subject to 
enforcement by Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor pursuant to TCA § 50-6-419(c)." Tenn. 
Comp R. & Regs. 0800-2-14-.08(1) (2015). Upon its issuance, a copy ofthis Order will be provided to the Penalty 
Program in accordance with Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-24-.03 (20 15). ("In addition to referrals made by a 
workers' compensation judge, any [Bureau] employee may refer any person or entity to the penalty program for the 
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reasoned, "An inflexible approach mandating that an employer provide medical benefits 
as a matter of course ignores the fact that every case is different and should be evaluated 
on its own merits. !d. Further, "the statute limits an employer's duty to provide medical 
benefits to cases where the employee has sustained an injury by accident as defined in the 
statute." !d. at * 11. 
Causation 
Turning now to the central issue of the case -whether Mr. Wade sustained an 
injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment - the 
starting point of analysis is the statute itself. The Workers' Compensation Law defines 
an "injury" as "an injury by accident ... arising primarily out of and in the course and 
scope of employment, that causes ... the need for medical treatment." Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 50-6-102(14) (2015). Further, an injury is "accidental": 
[O]nly if the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, 
arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, and is 
identifiable by time and place of occurrence, and shall not include the 
aggravation of a preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can be 
shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the aggravation 
arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (2015). 
The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of the 
employment are not synonymous "although both elements exist to ensure a work 
connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits." Blankenship v. Am. 
Ordnance Sys., 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005). An injury occurs in the course of 
employment if it takes place while the employee was performing a duty he or she was 
employed to perform. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. 
Panel 1993 ). Thus, the course of employment requirement focuses on the time, place, 
and circumstances of the injury. Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 314,318 
(Tenn. 2005). By contrast, arising out of employment refers to causation. Reeser v. 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997). An injury arises out of 
employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the 
work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Fritts v. Safety Nat'! Cas. 
Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005). Put another way, an injury arises out of 
employment when it "has a rational, causal connection to the work." Braden v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 833 S.W.2d 496,498 (Tenn. 1992). 
assessment of a civil penalty whenever the referring employee believes that there may have been a violation of the 
[Bureau's] rules or the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act."). The Court reasonably believes there was a 
violation of the Bureau's rules. 
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In addition, "[ a]n injury causes death, disablement or the need for medical 
treatment only if it has been shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it 
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the death, disablement or need for 
medical treatment, considering all causes." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C) (2015). 
"Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty means that, in the opinion of the 
physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or 
possibility." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D) (2015) (Internal quotation omitted). 
Thus, causation must be established by expert medical testimony, and an employee's lay 
testimony, without corroborative expert testimony, does not constitute adequate evidence 
ofmedical causation. Scott, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24 at *12. 
The Court finds Mr. Wade's testimony sufficient to prove he suffered an injury in 
the course of employment with AAA Cooper. Mr. Wade's credible, unrefuted testimony 
is that he hurt his low back while moving heavy office furniture and supplies through a 
narrow doorway at work for AAA Cooper. 
Had Mr. Wade received no medical care, this Court would be inclined to order 
AAA Cooper to provide a panel upon the Court finding he satisfied his burden to show 
that an incident took place at work resulting in injury. At an expedited hearing, an 
employee need not establish the compensability of his or her claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence, but rather where the employee comes forward with sufficient evidence to 
support that a work event resulted in injury, it may also be sufficient to support an order 
compelling an employer to provide a panel. See Lewis v. Molly Maid, et al, No. 2015-06-
0456, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 19, at *8-9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. 
Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). However, in the present case there is sufficient medical proof before 
the Court, and based on that proof, the Court cannot conclude Mr. Wade's injury is 
causally related to his work. 
First, the medical records indicate in a note dated May 1, 2016, that Mr. Wade 
reported back pain and received an injection prior to the alleged date of injury. Nowhere 
in the records admitted into evidence did a provider indicate that Mr. Wade hurt his back 
at work. Mr. Wade testified he continues to treat at the VA, but introduced no records 
other than the May 1 through June 12, 2015 records. The Court suspects the additional 
records, predating and after that timeframe, would likely shed additional light on 
causation. It is possible he suffers from a preexisting condition that the May 11, 2015 
accident aggravated. But the records do not state that, and this Court cannot award 
benefits on the basis of possibility or speculation alone. 
Second, the FMLA documents and in particular the September 24, 2014 leave 
request do not request leave for a work-related injury. Rather, the option directly below 
it- "my own serious health condition" - is checked. Mr. Wade acknowledged signing 
this document. 
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Name i,.( 0 '\J GJ t\. .(.t:_ 
Employee 10~ ill !Q ~ 9--
*****SUPPLEMENTAL LEAVF.***** 
lEAVE OF ABSENCE REQUEST FORM 
Hire Date_:)__; ili 2/J 0 lf 
location rJvtS -ll tJ::F 
Sto lus: V Rogular Pre-regular l'art·tlma l rcquestpermlsslonl~daysofffrllmworl:! 0 ~~t.~~ (date) through (date) 
OR -lf2-
to be absent on an Intermittent or roduced schedulo: ___ (date) through ___ (date) 
for the reuon(s) checked below: 
~Ore: If the le>vo request Is for medlcol r<ason:, you must have your heollh cars provlde.t complete tho appropriate 
coo1.1flcotfon. Completion of cortlncotlon form< lor other types of leave may also be required. Please conlllct the Human 
Development and Risk Management Department for specific requirements. 
REASON FOR lEAVE; I am requesting leave for the following reason(s): 
__ Work-related Injury or Illness; 
Date of Injury: Date Injury ftrst reported: 
.LMv l!ll!ll serious health condition, In eluding pregnancy, which makes me unable to perlonm the functions of my job 
(a "serious health condition" typically Is on Illness, injury, Impairment or physical or mental condition that Involves 
Inpatient care or continulns treatment bv a healthcare orovlderl: 
Likewise, the "Driver Fitness" form includes a checked box for "chronic low back pain." 
Mr. Wade credibly testified the physician checked the box but, again, he conceded 
signing it. 
Counsel for AAA Cooper expressed sympathy for Mr. Wade's pain and 
frustration. This Court echoes those sentiments. Nonetheless, the Court finds Mr. Wade 
has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence at this time to show he is likely to 
prevail at a hearing on the merits on the issue of whether his injury arose primarily out of 
and in the course and scope of his employment. Therefore, the Court must deny Mr. 
Wade's requested benefits. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Mr. Wade's requests for temporary disability benefits, additional medical care and 
reimbursement of medical expenses are denied at this time. 
2. This matter is set for an Initial (Scheduling) Hearing on June 13, 2016, at 8:45 
a.m. 
ENTERED this the 26th day of April, 2016. 
Initial (Scheduling) Hearing: 
An Initial (Scheduling) Hearing has been set with Chief Judge Kenneth M. 
Switzer, Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. You must call 615-532-9552 or 
toll-free at 866-943-0025 to participate in the Initial Hearing. 
Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation. 
Right to Appeal: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the 
date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be 
made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
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other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of 
Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal, 
may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the 
purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it 
with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited 
Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of 
the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing 
Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and 
accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers' Compensation 
Claims and must be approved by the Workers' Compensation Judge before the 
record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. 
6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within 
five business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of 
the evidence, specifying the issues presented for review and including any 
argument in support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if 
any, with the Court Clerk within five business days of the filing of the appellant's 
position statement. All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an 
interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the 
case from the evidence admitted during the expedited hearing; (2) a statement 
summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a 
statement of the issue(s) presented for review; and ( 4) an argument, citing 
appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority. 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibits: 
1. Medical Records of Lloyd Wade 
2. Affidavit ofLloyd Wade 
3. Affidavit of Rick Daniel 
4. First Report of Injury, July 7, 2015 
5. AAA Cooper Transportation Driver Scorecard 
6. Medical Examination Report for Commercial Driver Fitness Determination, June 29, 
2015 
7. Leave of Absence Requests, June 16, 2016, June 30, 2015, September 24, 2015 
8. AAA Cooper Letter to Mr. Wade, August 27, 2015 
9. Wage statement, February 2, 2016 
Technical Record: 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination, November 16, 2015 
2. Dispute Certification Notice, January 4, 2016 
3. Request for Expedited Hearing, January 12, 2016 
4. Employer position statement, January 29, 2016 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order was 
sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 26th day 
of April, 2016. 
Name Certified Via Via Service sent to: 
Mail Fax Email 
Lloyd Wade, self- X 2745 Parkdale Dr., Nashville 
represented TN 37217 
Heather Douglas, X hdouglas@manierherod.com 
Employer's attorney 
Compliance (Penalty X WCCompliance.Program@ 
Division) tn.gov 
, Clerk of Court 
Court of rkers' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtCie.-k@tn.gov 
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